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1TAKEOVER WAVES
Ram¶ on Faul¶ i-Oller
WP-AD 99-30
ABSTRACT
Horizontal takeovers often occur in waves. A sequence of takeovers is obtained
in a Cournot setting with cost asymmetries. They are motivated by two di®erent
reasons: (i) A low realization of demand increases the pro¯tability of takeovers.
(ii) Takeovers raise the pro¯tability of future takeovers. A possible explanantion
of merger races is also obtained by showing that ¯rms buying in the ¯rst place
pay a lower price for their targets.
Keywords: Takeovers; Antitrust; Demand.
21 Introduction.
It has been observed that mergers usually happen in waves (Mueller (1989)).
Two di®erent explanations have been used to explain this phenomenon: the non-
strategic and the strategic explanation (Caves (1991)). The former defends that
takeovers occur when some common exogenous factor makes them pro¯table. The
latter emphasizes the strategic interrelationship among ¯rms and argues that the
bunching (or wave-like behavior) stems from the fact that ¯rms ¯nd pro¯table to
merge only if competitors also merge.
I illustrate in a simple setting that both explanations are correct and therefore
they should be considered together in order to attempt to explain takeover waves.
In particular, it holds that low demand increases the pro¯tability of takeovers,
which con¯rms the non-strategic explanation. On the other hand, I ¯nd that
previous mergers stimulate future mergers in the industry, which con¯rms the
strategic explanation. The merger wave in the oil industry in 1998 and 1999 is a
nice illustration of this situation. The process was preceded by a long period of
low oil prices aggravated by the fall in demand due to the Asian crisis.
The results are obtained in a setting where ¯rms compete µ al aC o u r n o t ,
marginal cost is constant but it may di®er among ¯rms. Cost asymmetries stim-
ulate merger pro¯tability. Nevertheless, the di®erences in cost mean nothing in
absolute terms, but they should be related to price. Then it is when the size of
the market comes to the picture. Low demand implies low prices, which accentu-
ates the asymmetries between ¯rms. Therefore, low demand will enhance merger
pro¯tability.
This result di®ers from two previous results in the literature. If ¯rms are
symmetric and marginal cost is constant, merger pro¯tability does not depend
on market size (Salant et al. (1983)). On the other hand, van Wegberg (1994)
shows that if ¯rms face capacity constraints, mergers become more pro¯table
when market size increases, because non-participating ¯rms expands their output
less after merger. My result agrees with the empirical ¯nding that horizontal
mergers occur in declining industries as a device to rationalize capacity (Dutz
3(1989) and Odagiri and Hase (1989)).
The intuition behind the strategic explanation is the following. The reason
why takeovers are unpro¯table in Salant et al. (1983) is that non-participating
¯rms react to it by raising their output. This negative e®ect will be less acute
the lower the number of ¯rms free-ride from the output reduction induced by the
merger. Therefore, a takeover by reducing this number can induce new takeovers.
As far as the strategic explanation is concerned, my work is closely related to
Nilssen and Sorgard (1998). They provide a full characterization of the possible
interrelations between merger decisions. In the ¯rst place, mergers may either
encourage or discourage future mergers. In the second place, mergers of competi-
tors may either increase or decrease the pro¯ts of the other ¯rms. Combining all
possibilities they de¯ne four di®erent scenarios. They ¯nd that all are possible
using an example where ¯rms compete µ a la Cournot and mergers a®ect the cost
structure of the merging entity. My model is a new example of the scenario in
which mergers trigger new merger decisions and increase the pro¯ts of competi-
tors. This scenario is specially interesting, because it is the only one where the
"bandwagon e®ect" is obtained. Furthermore, the fact that the acquisition stage
is explicitly modeled in my case allows me to obtain new results. In particular, I
obtain that ¯rms buying in the ¯rst place pay a lower price for their targets.
In the second section, the model is set out. Section III analyses some exten-
sions of the basic model and Section IV concludes.
2T h e M o d e l .
We have two "e±cient" ¯rms (A and B) with constant marginal cost normalized
to zero and two "ine±cient" ¯rms (1 and 2) with unit cost c. All of them operate
in a market with linear demand P = ® ¡ X,w h e r eP is the price, X the sales
of the good and ®>3c. Before Cournot competition occurs, e±cient ¯rms are
allowed to sequentially bid for ine±cient ¯rms, so that market structure can be
altered. After the takeover the merged entity produces at zero cost. The previous
situation is modeled as a ¯ve stage game involving the following sequence of
4decisions.
First stage:F i r mAo ® e r sbi to buy ¯rm i (i =1 ;2).
Second stage: Ine±cient ¯rms decide simultaneously whether to accept the
bids or not. If ¯rm i (i =1 ;2) accepts, it sells the ¯rm to ¯rm A at price bi.
Third stage: Firm B makes bids to buy the remaining independent ine±cient
¯rms.
Fourth stage: Remaining independent ine±cient ¯rms decide simultaneously
whether to accept the bids or not.
Fifth stage: Remaining independent ¯rms compete µ a la Cournot.
We will use as a solution concept the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, so
that we proceed by backward induction. In Stage 5, we have simply a Cournot
game. Pro¯ts in equilibrium do depend on the number of ine±cient ¯rms having
been previously bought but not on whom carried out the takeover. The pro¯ts
in equilibrium of e±cient and active ine±cient ¯rms are denoted respectively by
¼(TA+TB;®)a n d¦ ( TA+TB;®), where Tj stands for the number of takeovers car-
ried out by Firm j. Given that ¯rm pro¯ts in the n-¯rm problem with individual
marginal costs ci are given by (Letho and Tombak (1998))
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In Stage 4, given the o®ers received by the ¯rms, we can determine the ac-
ceptance decisions in equilibrium. Ine±cient ¯rms will accept any o®er assuring
them, at least, their opportunity cost1, that is the pro¯ts they would obtain if
they stayed in the market.
1To avoid the open set problem, ine±cient ¯rms are assumed to accept o®ers when they are
indi®erent between accepting and not accepting.
5If one ine±cient ¯rm has been previously bought (TA = 1), the opportunity
cost of selling the ¯rm is unambiguously given by ¦(1;®). Therefore, the re-
maining ine±cient ¯rm only accepts if he receives a bid not lower than ¦(1;®).
If TA = 1, the opportunity cost of an ine±cient ¯rm depends on the acceptance
decision of the other ine±cient ¯rm as it is clear from the following payo® matrix.
Firm 2
Accept Reject
Firm A b1 b2 b1 ¦(1;®)
1 R ¦(1;®) b2 ¦(0;®)¦ ( 0 ;®)
If the other ¯rm accepts the opportunity cost of accepting is given by ¦(1;®).
If the other ¯rm does not accept the opportunity cost is given by ¦(0;®). There-
fore, in equilibrium, we have that both ¯rms accept if each receives an o®er not
lower than ¦(1;®), none accepts if each of them is o®ered less than ¦(0;®)a n d
only one accepts otherwise.
In Stage 3, ¯rm B decides how many ine±cient ¯rms to buy (TB)2.G i v e nTB,
bids are set such that targets only receive their opportunity cost.
If TA = 1, one takeover gives as much pro¯ts as none if the following condition
holds:
¼(2;®) ¡ ¼(1;®) ¡ ¦(1;®) ¸ 0( 2 )
In Appendix A, it is checked that it holds when 3c< ® · 15c.
If TA =0 ,t w ot a k e o v e r sg i v ea sm u c hp r o ¯ t sa so n ei f :
¼(2;®) ¡ 2¦(1;®) ¡ ¼(1;®)+¦ ( 0 ;®) ¸ 0( 3 )
two takeovers give as much pro¯ts as none if:
¼(2;®) ¡ 2¦(1;®)+¼(0;®) ¸ 0( 4 )
one takeover gives as much pro¯ts as none if:
¼(1;®) ¡ ¦(0;®) ¡ ¼(0;®) ¸ 0( 5 )
2In case of indi®erence, we will assume that the option with more takeovers is chosen.
6In Appendix A it is shown that when (3) holds TB = 2 is the optimal strategy




When (5) does not hold TB = 0 is the optimal strategy, because then (4) does










), TB = 1 is the optimal strategy.
To summarize the equilibrium strategies of ¯rm B, we de¯ne 4 di®erent zones















<®· 15c. Firm B buys one ¯rm only if ¯rm A has previously
bought one.
Zone 4: 15c<® . Firm B buys no ¯rm.
Intuition about the e®ect of market demand can be obtained by rewriting




























i =0 ;1( 7 )
In a Cournot setting with symmetric costs takeovers are very rarely pro¯table.
Increases in c increase takeover pro¯tability, because the cost savings obtained
from transferring output from the high-cost ¯rm to the low-cost merger partner
become greater. From (6), it is clear that reductions in ® h a v et h es a m ee ® e c t
as increases in c. Then it follows that ® negatively a®ects the pro¯tability of
takeovers.
The acceptance decisions in equilibrium in Stage 2 are like the ones in stage
4 when no ¯rm had been previously bought, except when costs belong to Zone 1
and 2.
3The multiplicative factor does not a®ect takeover decisions.
7In Zone 1, the opportunity cost of selling the ¯rm is ¦(1;®), independently of
the decision taken by the other ¯rm. Therefore, a ¯rm accepts the o®er whenever
he receives an o®er not lower than ¦(1;®).
In Zone 2, the opportunity cost of one ¯rm accepting when the other does
not, depends on whether by deviating he will be bought in Stage 4 or remain
independent. In the former case, the opportunity cost is ¦(0;®) and in the latter
¦(1;®). In other words, ine±cient ¯rms are no more symmetric, because they
obtain di®erent payo®s when they refuse both o®ers. One ¯rm will sell the ¯rm
to ¯rm B at ¦(0;®) and the other will remain independent obtaining pro¯ts of
¦(1;®).
We call Firm k (i;k =1 ;2a n di 6= k) the one that it is going to be bought
in Stage 4 by Firm B after Firm A has made o®ers (b1;b 2)a n dt h e yh a v eb e e n
rejected by ine±cient ¯rms. The payo® matrix is given by:
Firm k
Accept Reject
Firm A bi bk bi ¦(1;®)
i R ¦(1;®) bk ¦(1;®)¦ ( 0 ;®)
Then, Stage 2 acceptance decisions in equilibrium can be written as:
No ¯rm accepts, if bi < ¦(1;®)a n dbk < ¦(0;®).
Only Firm k accepts, if bi < ¦(1;®)a n d¦ ( 0 ;®) · bk.
Only Firm i accepts, if ¦(1;®) · bi and bk < ¦(1;®).
Both ¯rms accept, otherwise.
The optimal acquisition policy of ¯rm A in Stage 1 depends on which Zone
the intercept of demand belongs to.
In Zone 1, the obvious decision is letting ¯rm B buy the "ine±cient" ¯rms.
I nZ o n e4 ,t h eo b j e c t i v eo f¯ r mAi sl i k et h eo n eo f¯ r mBi nS t a g e3w h e n
TA = 0, so that he does not carry any merger.
In Zone 2, the cost of buying one ¯rm for ¯rm A is ¦(0;®). By o®ering to
each ¯rm this amount, one ¯rm will accept it in Stage 2. Then, ¯rm A should
compare the pro¯ts of carrying one takeover (¼(2;®)¡¦(0;®)) at this cost with
the ones obtained if only ¯rm B buys one ¯rm (¼(1;®)). For the resolution
8of Stage 3, in Zone 2 we know that ¼(2;®) ¡ ¦(1;®) >¼ (1;®). Therefore
¼(2;®) ¡ ¦(0;®) >¼ (1;®) and ¯rm A decides to carry a takeover out.
In Zone 3, ¯rm A has to compare the pro¯ts of taking a rival over that is
going to induce a new merger in the third stage (¼(2;®) ¡ ¦(0;®)) with the
ones obtained with no alteration in the market structure(¼(0;®)). It can be
checked that the former decision yields more pro¯ts because in Zone 3 it holds
that ¼(2;®) ¡ ¦(1;®) ¸ ¼(1;®).
In Figure 1, we summarize the results of the previous ¯ve stage game. For
t h es a k eo fs i m p l i c i t yw eh a v er e p r e s e n t e do u r¯ v es t a g eg a m ea sat w os t a g e
game. The acceptance and market stages have not been drawn, to focus our
attention on takeover decisions of ¯rm A and ¯rm B. Equilibrium strategies in
each subgame have been encircled. We have four di®erent cases depending on
which zone the intercept of demand ® belongs to. The ¯rst and last cases are
extreme. Either both takeovers occur in the last stage or no merger occurs.
The former result shows how more pro¯table takeovers become as the intercept
of demand decreases. The latter result should be understood as an extension
of the well-known unpro¯tability of takeovers in a symmetric Cournot setting.
Zone 1
9Zone 2: The e®ect of demand.
Zone 3: The Bandwagon e®ect.
Zone 4.
Figure 1: Summary of the game.
The other two cases are more interesting. Although the sequence of takeovers
10occurring in the equilibrium path is the same, there is a distinguishing feature
between both cases: the optimal strategy of ¯rm B in the subgame where no
merger has previously occurred. The di®erence is important, because in one case
(® belonging to Zone 3) the merger of ¯rm A causes the merger of ¯rm B while
in the other case (® belonging to Zone 2) the decision of ¯rm B is independent
of the decision taken by ¯rm A.
The main intuition from these results can be drawn from the fact that equa-
tion (5) imply (2) i.e. if it is pro¯table to go from four to three ¯rms, then it is
pro¯table to go from three to two ¯rms and the fact that ® decreases the prof-
itability of takeovers. Then the situation in the di®erent Zones can be explained.
Zone 4: (2) is not satis¯ed, hence (5) is also not satis¯ed. Therefore, no
takeover occurs.
Zone 3: (2) is satis¯ed, but (5) is not satis¯ed. Hence, if ¯rm A does not
merge then neither will ¯rm B. If ¯rm A merges then so will ¯rm B. Firm A ¯nds
pro¯table to trigger the takeover wave.
Zone 2: (5) is satis¯ed, hence (2) is also satis¯ed. As (4) does not hold, Firm
B does not want to carry two takeovers, so that one takeover is carried by each
¯rm.
Zone 1: Same as Zone 2, except that (4) holds. Therefore, all takeovers are
carried out by Firm B.
In Zone 2 and 3, although each "e±cient" ¯rms buys one "ine±cient" ¯rm,
Firm A obtains more pro¯ts than ¯rm B, because he pays less for his target:
while Firm B pays ¦(1;®), ¯rm A only pays ¦(0;®). The reason for this is that,
by buying ¯rst, ¯rm A can exploit at his advantage the competition between
"ine±cient" ¯rms.
113E x t e n s i o n s
3.1 Changes in the form of demand.
The two basic results behind the takeover waves in my model are the fact that
decreases in demand and previous takeovers stimulate takeover pro¯tability. In
this Section, I check the sensitivity of these two results to a relaxation of the





where b is a measure of the curvature of demand.
If ¯rms have constant marginal costs the equilibrium variables have the fol-
lowing particularities. Total output only depends on average cost. Firms pro¯ts












































































































. Therefore, increases in c has the same e®ect as decreases in ®.










) ¸ 0( 1 0 )










) ¸ 0( 1 1 )
The following Proposition shows that (10) and (11) only hold if ® is low
enough.
























) < 0 (See Appendix B).
Therefore there exist a>0 such that f(a)=0a n df(
c
®






























The proof of Proposition 1 shows that there exist positive a(b)a n dd(b)s u c h
that (10) holds if a(b) ·
c
®
and (11) holds if d(b) ·
c
®
. To prove that previous
takeovers increase takeover pro¯tability I have to check that d(b) <a (b). I am
not able to prove this result analytically. In Figure 2, we plot a(b)a n dd(b) for
speci¯c values of b. The desired inequality holds for these values.







Figure 2. Values of a(b) (bold line) and d(b) (thin line).
3.2 Changes in the extensive form.
3.2.1 Firm B can bid to monopoly.
In this Section we change the model in Section II so that Firm B can also bid for
Firm A. The question then is whether the takeover wave falls short of monopoly.
The takeover combinations of Firm B increase. However, we will see that in most
cases this is not relevant, because the new combinations give less pro¯ts4 that the
ones that were already possible in Section II. I recalculate the optimal takeover
decisions of Firm B. All calculations are in Appendix C.
If TA = 0, Firm B has 3 new possibilities: buying Firm A, buying Firm A
and an ine±cient ¯rm and monopolization. The ¯rst option is dominated by
b u y i n gn o¯ r m 5. The second one by buying two ine±cient ¯rms. Monopolization
is better than buying two ¯rms only if 3c<®· (1+2
p
1:1)c.O n l yi nt h i sr e g i o n
the takeover decisions of Firm B change. In the other cases, he takes the same
takeover decisions.
If TA = 1, Firm A has 2 new possibilities: buying Firm A and monopolization.
The ¯rst option is dominated by buying no ¯rm. The second one is better than
4Firm B is allowed to buy its three competitors, but this is very expensive, because it has
to pay to each of them their duopoly pro¯ts (Kamien and Zang (1990)).
5Letho and Tombak (1998) show that the pro¯tability of a merger of two symmetric ¯rms
only depends on the number of ¯rms in the industry. Then we can use the result in Salant et
al (1983) to show that they are only pro¯table in a duopoly.





. Only in this region
the takeover decisions of Firm B change. In the other cases, he takes the same
takeover decisions.
If TA = 2, Firm B buys Firm A.
Now we analyse the takeover decisions of Firm A. The only di®erence with the
previous situation is that the industry is monopolized in 3c<®· (1 + 2
p
1:1)c





if he buys an ine±cient ¯rm.
In the ¯rst case, the optimal strategy is letting Firm B monopolize the industry.
In the second case, he has to compare the pro¯ts of triggering the takeover wave
leading to monopolization with the ones obtained by simply waiting for Firm B
to buy the ine±cient ¯rms. When monopolization takes place Firm A will be
bought at ¼(0;®) and he will buy the ine±cient ¯rm at cost ¦(0;®). When Firm
B buys the ine±cient ¯rms he obtains ¼(0;®) and pays no cost, so this is a better
strategy. For the other values of ® h et a k e st h es a m ed e c i s i o n sa si nS e c t i o nI I .
We have the same market structure and sequence of takeovers as in Section
II except when 3c<®· (1 +2
p
1:1)c that the industry is monopolized by Firm
B.
3.2.2 Firm B can bid sequentially for ine±cient ¯rms.
In this Section we change the model in Section II so that Firm B can bid se-
quentially for ine±cient ¯rms. Two new stages are considered. After Stage 4,
Firm B can still bid for ine±cient ¯rms (Stage 5) and then ine±cient ¯rms decide
whether they accept the bids (Stage 6). Market competition follows (Stage 7).
The fact that, in the original model, ine±cient ¯rms were bid in two di®erent
rounds reduced the cost of buying them from 2¦(1;®)t o¦ ( 1 ;®)+¦(0;®)i nZ o n e
2 and Zone 3. If ¯rm B is allowed to bid for ine±cient ¯rms in two consecutive
stages, he can obtain the previous reduction in the cost of buying ine±cient ¯rms
so that he will be more likely to do it. The question then is whether it will still
be possible to generate takeover waves or Firm B will be the only ¯rm to engage
in takeover activity.
15We study the takeover decisions of Firm B. If TA = 1, nothing changes. If
TA =0 ; in Zone 1, the optimal decision will still be buying two ¯rms. In Zone
4, buying no ¯rm will still be more pro¯table than buying one. In Zone 2 and 3,
buying two ¯rms gives more pro¯ts than buying one, because
¼(2;®) ¡ ¦(1;®) ¡ ¦(0;®) ¸ ¼(1;®) ¡ ¦(0;®)( 1 2 )
holds. (12) is equation (2) that is satis¯ed in either Zone 2 or 3. Then the relevant
comparison is between the pro¯ts of buying two ¯rms and the pro¯ts of buying












<®· 15c). As those ® belong to Zone 3, for the calculations in
Section II, we know that it is pro¯table to do it.
This extension shows that takeovers waves occur in the original model not only
because bids are done sequentially, but also because they allow bidding ¯rms to
coordinate their takeover decisions so that they can share the costs of reducing
competition.
3.3 The bandwagon e®ect with Bertrand competition.
We consider the same model as in Section II but with Bertrand competition.
Firms produce four di®erentiated goods. The demand6 of good i (i =1 ;2;3;4)
is given by:




6The demand system can be obtained from the optimization problem of a representative
consumer with utility linear in income: U(q)+m,w h e r eq is a vector representing the quantities
consumed of the di®erentiated goods and m income. With n goods, Vives (1985) shows that if













Firm 1 (2) produces good 1 (2). Firm A (B) produces good 3 (4). All
¯rms have the same marginal cost normalized to zero. In order to use the same
description of the game as in Section II, ¯rm 1 and 2 are still called ine±cient
¯rms. Through takeover, a ¯rm increases the range of products it o®ers, for
example, if ¯rm A buys ¯rm 1, it will produce good 1 and 3 after the takeover.
On the other hand, the takeover process is considered to be costly. The (¯xed)
cost of carrying out one takeover is denoted by K. This hypothesis is introduced
to avoid all mergers being pro¯table. (Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show
that all two ¯rm mergers are pro¯table in our setting if K = 0). If all mergers
were pro¯table, we could not have the bandwagon e®ect. To simplify matters we
assume that buying two ¯rms is prohibitively costly.
To show that the bandwagon e®ect holds in this setting we need to compute
(see Appendix D) the pro¯ts in three di®erent market con¯gurations:




With 3 independent ¯rms, the merged entity obtains:
¦3 =
A2(1 ¡ b)(2 + b)2
2(2 ¡ 3b ¡ b2)2
and the other two ¯rms:
¼3 =
A2
(2 ¡ 3b ¡ b2)2




The gains of ¯rm A of buying a ¯rm in Stage 2 if the bandwagon e®ect holds
are given by:
¦2 ¡ 2¦4 ¡ K (13)
17The gains of Firm B of buying a ¯rm in Stage 4 (if ¯rm A has not previously
bought one) are given by:
¦3 ¡ 2¦4 ¡ K (14)
The gains of Firm B of buying a ¯rm in Stage 4 (if ¯rm A has previously
bought one) are given by:
¦2 ¡ 2¼3 ¡ K (15)
For the bandwagon e®ect to hold (Zone 3 in the graphical summary of the
game) we need that (13) and (15) are positive and (14) is negative. It is easy to
see that if (15) is positive (13) is also positive (competition decreases pro¯ts). It
is possible to ¯nd K such that (15) is positive and (14) is negative, because (15)
is greater than (14) (see Appendix D).
With Bertrand competition, mergers increase pro¯ts (gross of ¯xed costs),
because they allow joint pro¯t maximization of participating ¯rms (insiders) and
nonparticipating ¯rms (outsiders) react to the merger by increasing their prices.
The bandwagon e®ect holds in our setting, because this positive reaction of out-
siders is greater if they are merged.
To illustrate this point we calculate (see Appendix D) given the (symmet-
ric) prices of insiders (pi) the (symmetric) pro¯t-maximizing prices of outsiders
depending on whether they are merged or not.








As P 0(pi) >p 0(pi), outsiders react more to the increase in the price of outsiders
when they are merged. This explains that pro¯ts of insiders increase more when
outsiders are merged.
184C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s .
I obtain a sequence of takeovers in a Cournot setting with cost asymmetries.
They are motivated by two di®erent reasons:
(i) A low realization of demand increases the pro¯tability of takeovers.
(ii) A takeover triggers new takeovers in the industry by raising their prof-
itability. This phenomenon is usually called the "bandwagon e®ect".
Those results can be used in further research to generate takeover waves in
the same setting. We have also pointed out to an explanation of merger races by















¡®2 +1 8 ®c ¡ 45c2
72
¸ 0
This function is strictly concave in ® with zeros ® =3 c and ® =1 5 c. Therefore,


















¡131®2 + 1386®c ¡ 2979c2
3600
¸ 0





















¡97®2 +1 0 6 2 ®c ¡ 2313c2
1800
¸ 0





















¡7®2 +8 2 ®c ¡ 183c2
400
¸ 0





















, when (5) does not hold, (4) does not hold either.
20B Appendix B
Salant et al. (1983) show that f(0) < 0a n dg(0) < 0f o rb = 0. Then using

















)] = sign[¡180 ¡ 446b ¡ 362b
2 ¡ 106b
3 ¡ 10b
4 + (120 + 188b +
78b












































































































































































The second from the fact that I have eliminated all the terms with ( c
®)2 that are








Three new market structures become possible, because Firm A can be bought.




. Duopoly with Firm B and an in-

















. Pro¯ts are obtained using (1).































c(¡58® +1 3 3 c)
144
< 0





















¡5®2 +1 0 ®c +1 7 c2
72
¸ 0( 1 6 )
22This function is strictly concave in ® with zeros ® = c(1 § 2
p
1:1). Therefore,
(16) holds if 3c<®· (1 + 2
p
1:1). Observe that c(1 ¡ 2
p
1:1) < 3c.






























¡3®2 +1 0 ®c +1 7 c2
144
¸ 0( 1 7 )



































¡133®2 + 1638®c ¡ 3897c2
3600
¸ 0( 1 8 )
This function is strictly concave in ® with zeros ® =3 c and ® =
1299c
113
.T h e r e -





The pro¯t of ¯rm i if it is independent is given:




The FOC is given by:
A ¡ 2pi + b
X
j6=i
pj =0 ( 1 9 )
23The pro¯t of ¯rm i if it is merged with ¯rm k is given:
(A ¡ pi + b
X
j6=i




The FOC is given by:
A ¡ 2pi + bpk + b
X
j6=i
pj =0 ( 2 0 )
The equilibrium prices with 4 independent ¯rms are obtained by imposing
symmetry in all prices in (19):
A
2 ¡ 3b
This leads to the pro¯ts cited in the text.
The equilibrium prices with 2 (equal-sized) independent ¯rms are obtained
by imposing symmetry in (20):
A
2 ¡ 4b
This leads to the pro¯ts cited in the text.
The equilibrium if ¯rm i and j are merged an k an l are independent is obtained
the following way. Using (19) we write the (symmetric) pro¯t maximizing prices
of k and l (pk = pl = p) as a function of a symmetric strategy of the merging





Using (20) we write the (symmetric) pro¯t maximizing prices of i and j (P)





Solving (21)and (22) for p and P the equilibrium prices are obtained:
p =
A
2 ¡ 3b ¡ b2
P =
A(2 + b)
4 ¡ 6b ¡ 2b2
They lead to the pro¯ts cited in the text.
Now we check that (15) is greater than (14).
24¦2 ¡ 2¼3 ¡ ¦3 +2 ¦ 4 =
A2b4(12 ¡ 34b +7 b2 +2 7 b3)
2(1 ¡ 2b)2(2 ¡ 3b)2(2 ¡ 3b ¡ b2)2 > 0:
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